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Abstract 
This paper seeks to analyse the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
performance for fifty firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange during 2002-2003. 
The study initially tests a two equation model similar to that in the existing literature, but 
is distinguished from prior literature by subsequently reclassifying leverage. By 
categorising leverage as an endogenous variable, an examination of the relationship 
between ownership and performance is undertaken through ordinary least squares and 
two stage least squares analysis of a three equation econometric model. Interestingly, 
empirical results illustrate the fact that managerial ownership impacts negatively on firm 
performance which is consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis.  
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The relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has been 
debated significantly within finance literature. However, despite the attention this issue 
has received, there has been no consensus reached regarding the nature of this 
relationship. As Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) highlighted, the differences in results 
over the previous two decades could have been due to the fundamental disparity in 
methodology between papers as seen in Appendix 1. Recent research conducted in this 
area has had a high degree of incongruence due to the fact that estimation procedures, the 
measurement of variables and the classification of ownership have been inconsistent 
between studies. Consequently, it is not surprising that the research in this area has 
yielded conflicting results.  
The relationship between ownership and performance is intriguing. Despite the fact that 
authors such as Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
have found that ownership and performance are related, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
posit that no particular ownership structure appears to generate enhanced performance. 
The further development of research within this area of study will have widespread 
implications as it will evaluate the importance of managerial ownership in determining 
performance. In an ever increasing manner, management is being compelled to have a 
financial stake in the firm through the introduction of compensation policies such as 
stock grants and option plans. Where research illustrates that director ownership does not 
heighten performance, the importance investors and corporations place on this issue may 
be misguided.  
  2The present study revisits the work of previous authors and seeks to build-on the limited 
evidence regarding ownership and corporate performance within the Australian context. 
The current paper distinguishes itself from prior research conducted in the USA and 
Australia by questioning the classification of leverage as a pre-determined variable. By 
categorising leverage as an endogenous variable, a 3 equation model is developed to 
better understand the relationship between ownership and performance. The subsequent 
results have been compared with previous studies to assess their consistency with prior 
literature.  
The following section summarises and examines the previous research that has been 
conducted within this area. Section 3 provides the theoretical framework underpinning 
the model specifications which have been applied to the data outlined in section 4. 
Section 5 describes and explains the regression results, whilst also discussing their 
robustness based on alternative performance measures. Section 6 summarises the results 
of the current study, whilst also highlighting limitations and areas for future research. 
 
2. LITERATURE  REVIEW 
Berle and Means (1932) were among the first authors to look at the relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate performance. They assert that as ownership becomes 
increasingly dispersed, shareholders become powerless to control professional managers 
as they cannot effectively carry-out monitoring of management. Thus, they suggest that 
the diffuseness of ownership and performance should have a negative relationship.  
This hypothesis was reinforced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) who asserted that 
managers have incentives to pursue their own activities, to the detriment of shareholders. 
  3Where managerial ownership falls, agency costs intensify as management can benefit 
from the consumption of non-pecuniary benefits without incurring the cost. They put 
forth the convergence-of-interest hypothesis which suggests that with increased 
managerial ownership, corporate performance will strengthen as the interests of 
management and stockholders will be aligned. 
However, this was refuted by Demsetz (1983), as he identified offsetting costs of insider 
ownership. This lead him to posit that “no single ownership structure is suitable for all 
situations if the value of the corporation’s assets is to be maximised” (Welch, (2003) 
p.289). Consequently, this gave rise to the belief that the ownership structure of the firm 
was an endogenous variable. That is, the optimal ownership structure depends on the 
individual characteristics of the organisation.  
However, it is interesting to note that since this study, several important papers in the 
area have failed to take this endogeneity into account when estimating the effect of 
ownership on corporate performance. The seminal papers that have overlooked this 
important feature of ownership structure are Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), and most importantly Craswell, Taylor and Saywell 
(1997) in the Australian context. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), in a sample of 511 firms find no evidence of a linear 
relationship between ownership concentration and an entity’s performance. However, the 
methodology adopted in this study was questioned by Morck, et. al. (1988) due to the fact 
that the relationship was only tested for a linear association. To capture the possibility 
that the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance is non-
linear, Morck et. al. (1988) adopt a piecewise regression. Their results indicate that 
  4performance increases when management ownership is between 0-5% of outstanding 
stock due to incentive alignment between management and shareholders. However, when 
management ownership comes within the 5-25% range of outstanding stock, performance 
declines due to the management entrenchment hypothesis. As ownership of a substantial 
blockholding of stock acts as a deterrent to hostile acquirers, inefficient management 
teams can therefore remain in control of the firm, which negatively effects performance. 
However, once management ownership exceeds 25%, an unfriendly bid is virtually 
impossible and thus entrenchment is complete. Consequently, as insider ownership rises 
beyond this point, performance increases thereafter at a declining rate. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) analyse two significant samples of US corporations in 
1976 and 1986. They contend that the relationship between insider ownership and 
performance is curvilinear, and could not replicate the findings of Morck et. al (1988). 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) assert that at lower levels of insider ownership a 10% 
increase in ownership results in a 30% improvement in performance. However, the 
positive relationship between insider ownership and performance inflects at 37.6% and 
performance diminishes thereafter. Kole (1995) relates the differences in results for 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Morck et. al. (1988) to the variation in size of the 
firms used in the respective studies.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) utilise Tobin’s Q as the performance measure and the 
stock ownership levels of the present CEO and former CEOs still maintaining a position 
on the board. Undertaking a piecewise regression approach, they found no relationship 
between corporate performance and the composition of the board, However, like Morck 
et. al. (1988), they found a significant non-monotonic relationship between managerial 
  5ownership and performance. This relationship was positive between managerial 
ownership levels of 0% and 1%, declining between 1% and 5%, increasing between 5% 
and 20% and decreasing with managerial ownership in excess of 20%. 
Loderer and Martin (1997) attempt to capture the relationship between performance, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, and insider holdings through a simultaneous equations 
framework. After classifying both performance and ownership as endogenous, they found 
that insider ownership fails to predict performance, but performance is a negative 
predictor of insider ownership. However, it appears as though this relationship may be 
spurious as their 3-system equation appears to be under-identified. This under-
identification arises as the authors have added a binary variable to the model to overcome 
the lack of exogenous variables in the system. However, for a variable to be classed as 
pre-determined under the order condition, it must be a non-zero variable, thereby 
excluding binary variables (see Kmenta, p.542). 
Cho (1998) replicated the study undertaken by Morck et al (1988) and found a 
comparable non-monotonic relation between Tobin’s Q and managerial holdings. After 
categorising insider ownership and performance as endogenous, Cho estimates 3 
equations and concludes that Tobin’s Q affects the ownership structure of an entity, but 
not vice-versa.  
Himmelberg, Hubbard & Palia (1999) use Tobin’s Q as the measure of performance and 
shareholdings by insiders as the ownership variable. Where ownership is classified as an 
exogenous variable, the authors assert that changes in ownership have no significant 
impact on performance. However, after controlling for the endogeneity of corporate 
  6ownership structures using instrumental variables, they found ownership structure to have 
a quadratic relationship with performance.  
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) undertook a similar study to Morck et. al 
(1988). Like the previous research paper, the authors found a significant positive 
relationship between performance and insider holdings between 0% to 5%. However, 
unlike Morck et. al. (1988), the empirical evidence uncovered in this study yielded no 
statistically significant results beyond 5% managerial holdings.  
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) highlight the need to model ownership structure as a 
multi-dimensional variable, that separately reflects the fraction of shares owned by 
management, and the proportion of equity owned by outsiders. When conducting 
ordinary least squares regression analysis, and a subsequent two
-stage least squares test, 
they highlight the fact that “ownership structure is chosen so as to maximise firm 
performance, and that greater diffuseness in ownership, although it makes the agency 
problem more severe, conveys compensating advantages” (Welch, p.289). As a result, the 
ownership composition of an entity should have no systematic relationship with firm 
performance, and is the result of the “interplay of market forces” (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, p.212).  
With regard to the Australian context, Craswell, Taylor, and Saywell (1997) were the first 
researchers to document the relationship between ownership structure and performance. 
After undertaking three tests – a linear, curvilinear and piecewise regression – they found 
a weak curvilinear relationship. However, despite Demsetz positing the fact that 
ownership structure was endogenous in 1983, these authors have failed to take this into 
account. 
  7Consequently, Welch (2003) examined the Australian environment by replicating the US 
study of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). Welch initially undertook ordinary least squares 
and two stage least squares regression analysis to determine whether the relationship 
between ownership structure and performance exhibited a linear relationship. After 
accounting for the endogeneity of ownership, Welch’s 2-stage least squares regression 
highlighted that ownership structure is not significant in explaining corporate 
performance. Furthermore, to assess whether ownership and performance within the 
Australian context displayed a non-linear relationship, a general non-linear model was 
developed based on the previous study of Morck et. al (1988). However, results 




The methodology in this research paper will build on the foundations put forward by 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and Welch (2003) in the Australian environment. To 
ensure ease of comparison between the current study and Welch’s 2003 paper, a similar 
definition of terms will be used. 
Two ownership variables  are considered, the five largest shareholders (TOP5) and 
director stockholdings (MDO). The terms ‘management’ and ‘director’ are used 
interchangeably throughout this paper with respect to insider ownership. It is important to 
distinguish between the TOP5 and MDO because these respective groups have 
potentially divergent interests. The TOP5 illustrates the ability of outside shareholders to 
control the Board of Directors, and within the Australian context essentially consists of 
  8superannuation funds and fund managers. MDO reveals the ability of the management 
team to ignore other shareholder’s wishes. For example, Hutchison Telecommunications, 
an Australian firm included within this data set, has 84.61% of outstanding stock 
concentrated within the largest five shareholders. In contrast, management only comprise 
12.72% of stockholdings within this organisation. Consequently, within the context of 
this corporation, management is in no position to ignore shareholder wishes due to the 
fact that their positions on the board of directors may come under scrutiny as a result.  
These two ownership measures appear as explanatory variables in the corporate 
performance equation as they significantly influence the monitoring function within the 
firm. Where ownership accrues to outside investors, management behaviour would 
generally be monitored more thoroughly as in the case of Hutchison 
Telecommunications. However, where ownership concentration is in the hands of the 
management team, performance may enhance due to incentive alignment as hypothesised 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, with increased management ownership, 
corporate performance may also diminish based on the entrenchment hypothesis, 
whereby inefficient management remain in control due to their ability to thwart potential 
acquirors. The central motive for including these ownership variables within the equation 
modelling performance is to discover whether these variables systematically influence a 
entity’s operations. 
Two measures of performance are used: Tobin’s Q and average accounting profit rate 
(PROFIT). Using Tobin’s Q and PROFIT strengthens the study because the performance 
measures are derived from different variables. Tobin’s Q is a market based assessment of 
performance because it factors the market value of equity into calculations. Conversely, 
  9PROFIT is an accounting based performance measure which is constrained by the 
standards set by the accounting profession. Tobin’s Q is a forward looking performance 
measure which considers investor psychology and forecasts. In contrast, PROFIT 
provides a historical analysis of performance and is relatively unaffected by market 
psychology. Consequently, the adoption of a market based and accounting based 
assessment of performance is likely to yield more accurate results. 
These two measures of performance are also included as explanatory variables within the 
equation modelling management stock ownership. This is due to the fact that 
compensation plans, insider trading possibilities and corporate acquisitions suggest that 
performance may influence managerial holdings. Generally, where a firm has 
professional management and a diffuse set of stockholders, the agency problem is 
exacerbated due to the ineffective execution of the monitoring function. However, where 
this ownership structure brings compensating advantages that are sufficient to offset the 
adverse effects, there should be no systematic relationship between managerial ownership 
and corporate performance.  
However, due to insider information and performance based compensation plans, firm 
performance may have a substantial impact on director’s interests. This is due to the fact 
that management have incentives to vary their stockholdings in accordance with future 
performance in an effort to maximise their wealth. Consequently, there is also a reverse 
causation effect whereby performance affects managerial ownership.  
Within the two-equation  framework, it is also important to control for firm-specific 
characteristics. The control variables used in this instance are similar to those employed 
  10by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Welch (2003). The factors that are necessary to 
control for include: 
(A) Intangible assets  
This may favourably distort Tobin’s Q values because the book value of assets may not 
include all intangibles. Consequently, the denominator in the Tobin’s Q calculations will 
be understated resulting in the appearance of enhanced performance. As a result, the ratio 
of research and development (R&D) expenditure to sales is used to control for 
intangibles.  
However, given the fact that many of the corporations within the sample do not report 
any R&D spending, the inclusion of a dummy variable is necessary. Through adding a 
binary variable, spurious bias will be mitigated as entities will be separated into reporting 
and non-reporting classes. This ensures that the regression results will be conditional on 
the reporting of R&D spending. The coefficient estimates within a regression are 
generated by the deviations from the mean of the independent variable in both numerator 
(the covariance between independent and dependent variable) and denominator (the 
variance of the independent variable). As the mean for the independent variable will be 
shifted toward zero due to entities with unobservable R&D expenditures recording zero 
for this variable and entities reporting continuous measures, spurious estimates and 
probability values may result. The problem is further complicated because of interactions 
between deviations from the mean within the independent variable set. However, no 
specific conclusions have been determined with regard to the direction or significance of 
the bias introduced. The important point to grasp from this issue is the fact that the 
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model. This has been tested and found to be a necessary refinement for this model. 
(B) Leverage  
Leverage may have a positive relationship with performance. The pecking order theory of 
financing developed by Myers (1984) suggests that as retained earnings increases with 
good performance, management will choose to fund new projects with internally 
generated funds opposed to debt or equity financing. This implies that leverage and 
performance have a negative relationship. However, contrary to the pecking order theory, 
leverage and performance may have a positive relationship due to the tax shields offered 
by debt. As interest payments reduce a firm’s tax liability, an incentive is created to 
reduce taxation by funding projects which incur an interest expense. Consequently, 
leverage and performance may have a positive relationship.  
(C) Firm-Specific and Market Risk 
Firm-specific and market-risk account for the fact that there are different levels of risk 
associated with investing in different companies. With greater levels of risk, there is a 
greater prospect of management profiting from inside information. Consequently, there is 
a stronger causation effect in high-risk firms between variations in managerial holdings 
and corporate performance. 
(D) Firm Size  
Firm size has been incorporated into the study to account for the possibility that 
performance and ownership are related to the size of the entity. It is anticipated that a 
corporation’s size will have a negative relationship with director ownership. This is due 
  12to the fact that as market capitalisation increases, greater funds will be needed to achieve 
a desired level of ownership relative to a small firm.  
(E) Industry Specific Dummy variables  
To control for spurious correlation between ownership structure and corporate 
performance that stems from industry effects, a series of binary variables have been 
included. Dummy variables for the utility and finance industries are necessary to control 
for the relative advantage accruing to large blockholders caused by regulation within a 
particular industry which may dictate how a firm’s shareholders manage the entity’s 
assets. As the finance and utility industries are heavily regulated, the inclusion of dummy 
variables to account for these industry specifics will ensure that erroneous results do not 
ensue. 
Furthermore, an additional dummy variable to account for firms within the media 
industry has been included. The inclusion of this variable is necessary to explain the 
‘amenity potential’, or investor utility above and beyond that generated by profitability 
with respect to media companies. As substantial shareholders in media firms are often in 
the public spotlight, it is expected that ownership within these firms will be more 
concentrated.  
3.1  Simple Two Equation Model 
The two equation econometric model that has been developed in this study is outlined 
below. Calculations illustrating the fact that this model satisfies the order condition for 
identification can be seen in Appendix 2. However, this order condition only provides 
evidence of identification or over-identification of variables in each separate equation.  
 
  13Q = β0 + β1MDO + β2TOP5 + β3RDSALE + β4RDDUM + β5LEV + β6UTIL + β7MED + 
β8F I N                           ( 1 )  
 
MDO = α0 + α1LEV + α2UTIL + α3MED + α4FIN + α5MKTRISK + α6FIRMRISK + 
α7SALES + α8Q                         ( 2 )  
 
where: 
Q             =  The  average  annual  Tobin’s  Q  values  for  2002  and  2003.  Annual 
Tobin’s Q’s are calculated as [(year-end book value of debt + year-end 
market value of equity) / year end book value of assets]. Return on capital 
is also adopted as an alternative accounting based performance measure. 
Accounting profit is calculated as (net income / capital employed) x 100; 
MDO        =  Loge[RAWMDO / (100 – RAWMDO)], where RAWMDO is the 
average year-end percentage of ordinary shares owned by the board of 
directors calculated over 2002 and 2003; 
TOP5 =  Loge[RAWTOP5 / (100 – RAWTOP5)], where RAWTOP5 is the 
percentage of ordinary shares owned by the five largest shareholders of 
the firm; 
RDSALE  = The average annual ratio of research and development expenditure to 
total sales over 2002 and 2003; 
RDDUM  = A dummy variable indicating whether research and development 
expenditure was reported in the company’s annual reports. Where research 
  14and development was reported, this variable is equal to 0, and where no 
research and development expenditure is reported, this variable is set to 1;  
LEV  = The average ratio of year-end debt to the year-end book value of assets 
calculated over 2002 and 2003; 
UTIL  = A dummy variable to indicate whether the firm is a utility company. 
This variable equals 0 where the firm does not operate within the utility 
industry, and 1 if it’s operations fall within this industry classification; 
MED  = A dummy variable to indicate whether the firm is a media company. 
This variable equals 0 where the firm does not operate within the media 
industry, and 1 if its operations fall within this industry classification; and 
FIN  = A dummy variable to indicate whether the firm is a finance company. 
This variable equals 0 where the firm does not operate within the finance 
industry, and 1 if its operations fall within this industry classification; 
MKTRISK  = The raw beta coefficient obtained from a regression of weekly stock 
returns using stock price data from January 2000 to December 2003 
inclusive;  
FIRMRISK  = The standard error obtained from the regression used to estimate 
MKTRISK; 
SALES  = A proxy for firm size measured as the average annual sales or turnover 
during 2002 and 2003; and  
 
When analysing the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance 
within the two equation model, the maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients 
  15have been obtained though the use of ordinary least squares (OLS), biased ordinary least 
squares and two stage least squares regression analysis. Biased ordinary least squares 
differ from ordinary least squares due to the fact that the endogenous variables are 
included in the regression and treated as exogenous variables in the former but excluded 
from the equations for OLS estimation. However, as endogenous right-hand side 
variables are explained by the dependent variable, this may lead to bias being introduced, 
resulting in spuriously higher levels of significance. Consequently, the biased ordinary 
least squares regression does not test for the endogeneity of ownership structure and firm 
performance, although the basic variant of this test does incorporate this differing 
classification. The two stage least squares estimator employs the fitted value(s) of 
endogenous variables in the other endogenous variable equation. The two stage least 
squares estimator tends to underestimate standard errors relative the biased ordinary least 
squares estimator because the fitted values are too smooth relative to original raw 
variables so that variability in the inverse of the X matrix is reduced. This latter issue is 
well documented in the econometrics literature. It follows that the competing sets of 
results should be viewed and interpreted as a whole.  
 
3.2 Three Equation Model 
However, the 2 equation model may lead to specious results as leverage is classified as 
strictly endogenous. The current study is extended further by questioning the 
classification of leverage as exogenous. However, several studies into capital structure 
theory (Panno, 2003 & Kayhan & Titman, 2003) cast doubt on the exogeneity of 
  16leverage. This endogeneity of leverage is further alluded to in Loderer and Martin’s 
(1997) study.  
Pursuant to Panno (2003) and Kayhan and Titman (2003), leverage is dependent on 
profitability. As an entity’s profitability is also determined by leverage pursuant to 
equation 1, it is clear that leverage would be classified as an endogenous variable where 
average accounting profit rate is used as the performance measure. Whether the 
classification could be argued as weakly exogenous (as in the two-equation system), 
weakly endogenous (as in a recursive third equation for leverage in a three equation 
system), or strictly endogenous (as in a full three equation simultaneous system) is an 
issue. If Tobin’s Q does incorporate measures of expectation because it factors in market 
value of equity whilst leverage does not then the issue becomes an empirical question. 
This is a very important econometric issue as expectations are incorporated within the 
data and models in a cross section of data. This issue is quite separate from models of 
expectations developed within the econometric literature when employing time series 
data. In this paper both two-equation and three-equation structures are estimated and 
reported that do account for this classification issue   
Furthermore, where Tobin’s Q is the used as the performance measure, there is sufficient 
interrelation to query the classification of leverage as a pre-determined variable. Tobin’s 
Q is a quasi debt to asset ratio modified to account for the market value of equity. As a 
result of the fact that Tobin’s Q has a leverage ratio incorporated into it, there may be 
interdependence between leverage and performance, and thus, the exogeneity of this 
variable is further questioned. 
The variables that influence the extent of leverage within an entity include: 
  17(I) Firm Size  
This variable is adopted to account for the size of the firm impacting the level of debt in a 
corporation’s capital structure. Panno (2003) suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between firm size and leverage, highlighting that larger entities can better support higher 
debt ratios. The relative ease at which larger organisations can source funds from 
financial markets further supports the inclusion of this variable.  
(II) Risk  
Leverage and risk appear to have a negative correlation. Riskier firms tend to issue equity 
rather than debt as the high uncertainty makes fixed interest commitments perilous. As 
payments to shareholders are flexible compared with the fixed interest obligations of debt 
financing, where a firm has relative uncertainty with regard to cash flows, non-debt 
financing alternatives will be favoured.  
(III) Liquidity  
It is predicted that liquidity will have a positive effect on a corporations borrowing 
decisions. This is consistent with the notion that a firm’s ability to meet it’s short-term 
payments is of the utmost importance. Where an organisation has strong liquidity, it has a 
greater capacity to meet it’s financial commitments. Consequently, a positive relationship 
between leverage and liquidity is predicted.  
(IV) Profit  
Contrary to the pecking order theory, profit is anticipated to have a positive relationship 
with leverage. Pursuant to the Traditional theory and Modigliani-Miller theory, this may 
be due to the tax shields offered by debt. As a firm’s tax liability increases with 
profitability, so too will the incentive to reduce tax payable through debt tax shields (for 
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profitability and leverage are predicted to have a positive relationship. 
(V) Payout Ratio  
It is also anticipated that a positive relationship exists between a company’s payout ratio 
and leverage. This is consistent with the view that increased dividend costs and a sticky 
dividend policy will act as a disincentive to issue equity.  
(VI) Market Timing  
Firms tend to issue equity following stock price increases as they can raise funds on more 
favourable terms. As a result, corporations are more likely to raise further equity capital 
in a bull market compared with a bear market. Consequently, leverage has a predicted 
negative relationship with the company’s price to earnings ratio. 
(VII) Payout and Market Timing Dummy 
It is necessary to include a dummy variable within the leverage equation to account for 
the fact that the data set is incomplete. As some firms reported negative earnings per 
share for the two year period ending 31
st December 2003, it is impossible to generate a 
payout ratio or P/E ratio. Similar to the R&D dummy variable, the inclusion of another 
binary variable in this instance will re-classify corporations into those that reported 
payout and price to earnings ratios and those that did not.  
(VIII) Retained Profits  
Myers (1984) highlighted that firms prefer to fund their investments primarily through 
retained earnings. Debt financing is the next best alternative due to tax shields and the 
comparatively significant transaction costs associated with capital raising. Consequently. 
retained profits should impact negatively on the level of debt finance. 
  19One aspect of capital structure determination that this study overlooks is the clientele 
effect of debt. The magnitude of leverage within a particular entity’s capital structure 
may be influenced by the type of investors holding stock. As individual investors have 
differing taxation affairs, an analysis of every organisation’s shareholder register would 
be necessary to examine the taxation incentives for incorporating debt into the capital 
structure. As this information is problematic and onerous to collate, the clientele effect of 
debt is outside the scope of this study.  
Thus, the 3 equation econometric model is an extended version of the two equation 
system earlier elucidated. The model is specified by the addition of a third equation for 
leverage and where equations 1 and 2 are identical to those outlined earlier within the 
previous simplified model: 
 
Equation 3 
LEV = γ0 + γ1SALES + γ2MKTRISK + γ3FIRMRISK + γ4LIQ + γ5Q+ γ6PAYOUT + 
γ7P/E + γ8PAYPEDUM+ γ9RETPROFIT                   (3) 
 
where: 
SALES, MKRISK, FIRMRISK, and Q are as defined in the two-equation system and    
LIQ  = For non-financial sector firms, LIQ is measured as the average annual 
current ratio during 2002 and 2003. The current ratio is defined as current 
assets / current liabilities. However, as banks and insurance companies do 
not differentiate between short-term and long-terms items in the balance 
sheet, several proxies have been used to gauge liquidity. An appropriate 
  20test of liquidity for insurance companies is premiums / claims, whilst a 
proxy for liquidity within the banking industry is loans / deposits. These 
are suitable indicators of liquidity as they are the measures typically used 
within the industry; 
PAYOUT  = The payout ratio is calculated as (annual total dividends paid to ordinary 
stockholders / total annual net income) x 100; 
P/E  = P/E is a measure of market timing and can be calculated as stock price / 
EPS; 
PAYPEDUM = As corporation’s reporting negative net income or EPS do not record a 
payout ratio or P/E ratio, a dummy variable has been included. This equals 
0 where the firm does report results, and 1 if they do not.  
RETPROFIT  = The average annual balance of retained earnings during 2002 and 2003. 
Retained profits include accumulated earnings, earned surplus, or 
unappropriated profit that have been retained by the company.  It also 
includes legal reserves and the current year's net profit.   
The classification of leverage greatly affects the construction of the model developed in 
this paper. To account for the fact that leverage may not be a pre-determined variable, 
this study will utilise a two stage least squares approach within a 3 equation model. To 
check that this system of equations satisfies the order condition, a test for identification 
has been undertaken. From Appendix 3, it is shown that the current econometric model 
satisfies the order condition. However, this order condition only provides evidence of 
identification or over-identification of variables in each separate equation. Satisfying the 
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equations in the system.  
However, satisfying the matrix rank condition is more complex. The classical normalized 
or non-normalized martrix rank conditions are not defined for the current model or 
models in this existing literature. Consequently, it will be necessary to derive an 
alternative specialised matrix rank condition employing the methods outlined in Hsiao 
(1983), Magnus and Neudecker (1988) and Gannon (1994). This is an area for future 
research in this literature.  
 
4. DATA 
The sample utilised in this study comprises a randomly selected sample of 50 Australian 
publicly listed companies that were trading on the ASX between 2002 and 2003 
inclusive. Bloomberg has been the primary source of information. However, where 
additional information was needed, Connect4 has been used. In particular, Connect4 was 
employed to gather equity ownership with respect to the board of directors and the largest 
five shareholders. Furthermore, it was additionally utilised to verify questionable data. 
Summary statistics relating to the data can be found in Table 1. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 highlight some salient information about the data set 
analysed in this study. Where a study relies on a small sample size, as is the case in this 
instance, the assumption of normality is crucial in obtaining robust results. However, 
when perusing the descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table 1, it is clear that some of the 
data is of a non-normal nature. Where data is normally distributed, skewness, kurtosis 
and the Jacque-Bera statistic should be approximately 0,3 and 0 respectively. It is clear 
  22that many of the variables, particularly Tobin’s Q, payout ratio and retained profits are 
somewhat positively skewed. This highlights that the probability distribution of the 
variables are of an asymmetrical nature.  
 
TABLE 1 
Summary Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Modelling Ownership 
Structure with Firm Performance 
PANEL A - FIRM SIZE 
            
< 200m  200m-500m  $500m - $1.5b  $1.5b - $3b  $3b - $5b  $5b-$10b  > $10b 
6 6  10  14  4  5  5 
PANEL B -DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
               
Variable Mean  Median  Maximum Minimum Std.  Dev. Skewness Kurtosis  Jacque-Bera Count
Q  1.290  1.137 9.397  0.2125 1.258 5.643 36.64  2622  50 
PROFIT  4.211 7.630  49.97  -48.68  14.27 -0.9260 5.315  18.31  50 
RAWMDO  10.55 1.044  81.79  0.0194  17.14 2.210 5.463  53.36  50 
MDO  -4.242 -4.553  1.502  -8.545  2.824 0.0729  -1.267  37.98  50 
RAWTOP5  50.02 48.87  84.61  21.90  15.07 0.2574  -0.289  23.09  50 
TOP5  0.0074 -0.0452  1.704  -1.272  0.6630 0.3539 0.1404  18.08  50 
RDSALE  4.705 0.0022  49.65  0.0000  12.31 2.999 8.588  140.0  26 
LEV  26.85 25.39  86.91  0.034  16.69 1.197 2.838  6.241  50 
MKTRISK  0.8168 0.7400  2.710  -0.070  0.5478 1.361 2.746  15.56  50 
FIRMRISK  0.2006 0.1800  0.5500  0.070  0.1033 1.607 2.698  21.71  50 
SALES ($M)  3578 1183 29463  49.30  6325  2.816 8.036  118.9  50 
LIQ  1.500 1.463  6.704  0.2729 0.9886 3.181 15.32  400.7  50 
PAYOUT  102.4  71.95 900.7  0.0000 146.9 5.025 27.44  1018  35 
P/E  27.74 19.67  180.4  4.878  32.19 3.974 16.68  364.9  35 
RETPROFIT ($M)  718.3 111.0 12995  -661.01  2366  4.573  21.02  851.1  50 
The notation used in the above table is as follows: Q is the average of annual Tobin’s Q values for 2002 and 2003. Annual Tobin’s Q is 
calculated as [(year-end book value of debt + year-end market value of equity) / year end book value of assets]; PROFIT is the average 
annual return on capital for 2002 and 2003. Annual profit rates are calculated as [(net income / capital employed) x 100]; RAWMDO is 
the average year-end percentage of ordinary stock owned by directors calculated over 2002 and 2003; MDO is the natural log of 
[RAWMDO / (100-RAWMDO)]; RAWTOP5 is the percentage of ordinary stock owned by the five largest shareholders during 2003; 
TOP5 is the natural log of [RAWTOP5 / (100-RAWTOP5)]; RDSALE is the average ratio of annual R&D expenditure to annual sales, 
and is the average of the 2002 and 2003 ratios; LEV is the average ratio of debt to the book value of assets, and is calculated as the 
average of the 2002 and 2003 ratios; MKTRISK is the β coefficient obtained from a weekly regression of stock returns on weekly market 
returns; FIRMRISK is the standard error of the β estimate obtained to measure MKTRISK; SALES is the average annual sales results 
obtained in 2002 and 2003; LIQ relates to the average year-end current ratio in 2002 and 2003, where current ratio is calculated as 
(Current Assets / Current Liabilities). With regard to banking institutions, LIQ is calculated as (loans / deposits). For insurance 
companies, LIQ is determined by (Premiums / Claims); PAYOUT is the average annual payout ratio over 2002 and 2003 as is calculated 
as [(annual dividends paid to ordinary shareholders / total annual net income) x 100]; P/E is a measure of market timing and is calculated 
as (stock price / EPS) and averaged over 2002 and 2003; and, RETPROFIT is the average annual balance of retained earnings over 2002 
and 2003 including legal reserves and the current year’s net profit. 
 
Kurtosis refers to the shape of the probability distribution of a given variable. Essentially, 
it measures the height of the peak and the size of the tails. As a normally distributed 
  23variable should have kurtosis of 3, some variables in this data set display non - normality. 
Of particular concern are the variables: Tobin’s Q, liquidity, payout ratio, P/E ratio and 
retained profits. The non-normality observed in Tobin’s Q could be of particular concern 
as it is one of two competing endogenous measures of firm performance. Non-normality 
of some remaining exogenous variables may be mitigated via a suitable transformation, 
however, that was not undertaken here to maintain similarities with this existing 
literature. The important principle to be appreciated from these descriptive statistics is the 
fact that with some non-normal variables results may differ across competing models.   
 
 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1  Two Equation Model 
5.1A OLS  Results 
Initially, a 2 equation model comparable to that of Welch (2003) has been tested. 
Leverage has not been classified as an endogenous variable in either the ordinary least 
squares or two stage least squares analysis. As illustrated by results contained in Table 
2A the ordinary least squares regression yielded insignificant results with regard to the 
variables explaining performance, as measured by  Tobin’s Q.  
As illustrated by results contained in Tables 2A, the ordinary least squares regression 
yielded insignificant results with regard to the  variables  explaining  performance,  as  
measured  by  Tobin’s Q . Neither  the basic  nor biased ordinary least squares tests 
uncovered any variables exhibiting significant results. As these results may have been 
flawed by the inclusion of imperfect data, a regression with the exclusion of research and 
development expenditure to sales has also been executed. However, the subsequent 
  24results also gave no insight into the determination of performance and have not been 
included in the analysis.  
Interestingly, where Tobin’s Q is the performance measure, performance and ownership 
structure do not exhibit a significant relationship. However, when profit is employed as 
the performance measure (as seen in Table 2B), managerial ownership is a significantly 
negative predictor of corporate performance. Although this appears contrary to the 
incentive alignment hypothesis put forward by Jensen and Meckling  (1976), this may 
support the management entrenchment concept advanced by Morck et. al (1988). As 
previously explained, the management entrenchment theory supports the notion that 
managerial ownership may adversely impact on performance by frustrating takeover bids 
thereby preserving incumbent management’s inefficient administration. Additionally, 
profit was not significant in explaining insider ownership.  
The ordinary least squares regression did produce more significant results regarding 
explanation of management ownership. Pursuant to the results in Table 2A and Table 2B, 
market risk, sales and the media and finance industry dummy variables were all 
significant in explaining ownership level. The positive coefficient for the media industry 
is consistent with the notion that this industry exudes amenity potential above and beyond 
that generated by profitability (see Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). Consequently, 
management ownership is more concentrated within this industry.  
In contrast, the negative coefficient for firms within the finance industry supports the 
view that excessive regulation within this industry imposes unwanted constraint upon 
shareholders. As noted in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001,p.222)“regulation severely 
  25circumscribes what management and outside investors can do with the assets owned by 
these firms”.  
TABLE 2A 
Regression Results for Two Equation Model Where Performance is Measured by 
Average Annual Tobin’s Q 
       Performance          Ownership 
Variable OLS 
BIASED 
OLS 2SLS  Variable  OLS 
BIASED 
OLS 2SLS 
INTERCEPT  1.628 1.247 1.646  INTERCEPT  -5.557 -4.686  -1.638 
 (3.598***)  (2.157**)  (2.221**)   -6.232*** -4.606***  -0.6925 
MDO  - -0.0821  0.0039 LEV  0.0045 0.0004  -0.0199 
 -  (-1.055)  (0.0316)    0.2396  0.0227  -0.8640 
TOP5  -0.0239 0.0589 -0.0267  MEDIA  2.552 2.314  1.577 
 (-0.0757)  (0.1814)  (-0.0806)    2.295**  2.107**  1.298 
RDSALE  0.0228 0.0222 0.0227  FINANCE  -1.423 -1.836  -3.520 
 (0.9902)  (0.9668)  (0.9586)    -1.352  -1.731*  -2.253** 
RDDUM  -0.2256 -0.0879 -0.2288 UTILITY  -0.4327 -0.5824  -1.207 
 (-0.549)  (-0.2041)  (-0.5349)   -0.3992  -0.5466  -1.056 
LEV  -0.0055 -0.0059 -0.0055  MKTRISK  3.145 3.240  3.063 
 (-0.4304)  (-0.4634)  (-0.4264)   3.315***  3.481***  3.307*** 
MEDIA  -0.3825 -0.2082 -0.3921  FIRMRISK  -2.636 -3.588  -2.126 
 (-0.5763)  (-0.3048)  (-0.5320)    -0.5663  -0.7807  -0.4674 
FINANCE  -0.7381 -1.003 -0.7282  SALES  -2.559 -2.68E-10 -2.63E-10 
 (-1.11)  (1.413)  (-0.9807)   -4.126*** -4.375***  -4.337*** 
UTILITY  -0.2589 -0.3884 -0.2536  Q  - -0.4075  -2.239 
 (-0.3827)  (-0.5656)  (0.7048)    -  (-1.668)  (-1.78*) 
          
R
2 0.1178 0.1411 0.1178  R
2 0.5363 0.5658  0.5696 
Adjusted R
2 -0.0292 -0.0264 -0.0543  Adjusted  R
2 0.4591 0.4811  0.4857 
Note: T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates and documented within ( ). * denotes significant to 10% level; ** 
denotes significant to the 5% level; and, *** denotes significant to the 1% level. The notation used in the above table is as follows: 
Tobin’s Q is the average of annual Tobin’s Q values for 2002 and 2003. Annual Tobin’s Q is calculated as [(year-end book value of 
debt + year-end market value of equity) / year end book value of assets]; MDO is the natural log of [RAWMDO / (100-RAWMDO)]; 
TOP5 is the natural log of [RAWTOP5 / (100-RAWTOP5)]; RDSALE is the average ratio of annual R&D expenditure to annual 
sales, and is the average of the 2002 and 2003 ratios; RDDUM is a dummy variable equalling 0 where the firm reports R&D 
expenditure and 1 where is fails to; LEV is the average ratio of debt to the book value of assets, and is calculated as the average of the 
2002 and 2003 ratios; MEDIA is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the media industry and 0 where it operates 
elsewhere; FINANCE is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the finance industry and 0 where it operates 
elsewhere; UTILITY is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the utility industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere 
MKTRISK is the β coefficient obtained from a weekly regression of stock returns on weekly market returns; FIRMRISK is the 
standard error of the β estimate obtained to measure MKTRISK; and, SALES is the average annual sales results obtained in 2002 and 
2003.  
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TABLE 2B 
Regression Results for Two Equation Model Where Performance is Measured by 
Average Accounting Profit 
 
       Performance          Ownership 
Variable OLS  BIASED  OLS  2SLS Variable OLS  BIASED  OLS  2SLS 
INTERCEPT  7.126 -0.3523 -6.299  INTERCEPT -5.558 -4.358  -3.853 
 (1.343)  (-0.0533)  (-0.7614)   (-6.233***)  (-3.467***)  (-2.993***)
MDO  - -1.614  -2.823  LEV  0.0045 0.0030  -0.0118 
 -  (-1.813*)  (-2.064**)  (0.2396)  (0.1603)  (-0.5732) 
TOP5  -2.678 -1.051 -0.6287  MEDIA  2.552 2.305  2.727 
 (-0.7239)  (-0.2831)  (-0.1700)    (2.296**)  (2.065**)  (2.507**) 
RDSALE  0.0473 0.0362  0.1404  FINANCE  -1.424 -1.818  -2.043 
 (0.1753)  (0.1378)  (0.5323)    (-1.352) (-1.678)  (-1.887*) 
RDDUM  -5.423 -2.716  -3.126  UTILITY  -0.4327 -0.4184  0.1940 
 (-1.125)  (-0.5516)  (-0.6548)   (-0.3992)  (-0.3897)  (0.1744) 
LEV  -0.0446 -0.0528  -0.0254  MKTRISK  3.145 3.305  2.748 
 (-0.2979)  (-0.3619)  (-0.1755)    (3.316***)  (3.489***)  (2.891***) 
MEDIA  2.559 5.985  9.540  FIRMRISK  -2.637 -7.546  -3.311 
 (0.3288)  (0.7662)  (1.16)    (-0.5663)  (-1.282)  (-0.7271) 
FINANCE  0.1954 -5.014  -7.045 SALES  -2.559 -2.75E-10  -2.53E-10 
 (0.0251)  (-0.6178)  (-0.8501)   (-4.127***)  (-4.362***)  (-4.192***)
UTILITY  5.148 2.604  1.294  PROFIT  - -0.0411  -0.198 
 (0.6489)  (0.3317)  (0.1644)    -  (-1.342)  (-1.795*) 
            
R
2 0.0574 0.1274  0.1461  R
2 0.5363 0.5559  0.5701 
Adjusted R
2 -0.0997 -0.0429  -0.0205  Adjusted R
2 0.4591 0.4692  0.4862 
Note: T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates and documented within ( ). * denotes significant to 10% level; ** denotes 
significant to the 5% level; and, *** denotes significant to the 1% level. The notation used in the above table is as follows: PROFIT is the 
average of annual return on capital values for 2002 and 2003. Return on capital is calculated as [(net income / capital employed) x 100]; 
MDO is the natural log of [RAWMDO / (100-RAWMDO)]; TOP5 is the natural log of [RAWTOP5 / (100-RAWTOP5)]; RDSALE is the 
average ratio of annual R&D expenditure to annual sales, and is the average of the 2002 and 2003 ratios; RDDUM is a dummy variable 
equalling 0 where the firm reports R&D expenditure and 1 where is fails to; LEV is the average ratio of debt to the book value of assets, and 
is calculated as the average of the 2002 and 2003 ratios; MEDIA is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the media 
industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere; FINANCE is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the finance industry and 
0 where it operates elsewhere; UTILITY is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the utility industry and 0 where it 
operates elsewhere MKTRISK is the β coefficient obtained from a weekly regression of stock returns on weekly market returns; FIRMRISK 
is the standard error of the β estimate obtained to measure MKTRISK; and, SALES is the average annual sales results obtained in 2002 and 
2003.  
 
An entity’s size, as measured by sales, is a negative predictor of ownership regardless of 
the performance measure engaged. This result is consistent with Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) and seeks to highlight that as a corporation grows in size, a larger investment is 
  27required by shareholders to own a given percentage of stock when compared with a 
smaller firm.  
Lastly, market risk is a strong positive forecaster of management ownership, although 
firm-specific risk produced insignificant results. This is consistent with the results of 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) who also reported market risk as a significantly positive 
influence on management stockholdings. Although this appears contrary to market 
pragmatism, two theories are elucidated in this study. One possible cause of the positive 
coefficient reported for market risk may be the fact that as risk increases, management tie 
their funds up in businesses where they have an acute understanding. Additionally, firms 
exhibiting higher levels of risk may insist on their management team purchasing stock to 
ensure incentive alignment.  
 
5.1B  Two Stage Least Squares Results 
In addition to the ordinary least squares analysis, a two-stage least squares regression has 
also been conducted to account for the endogeneity of ownership. Although results for 
these tests yielded similar results to the ordinary least squares approach, there were some 
subtle distinctions. Once again, the variables explaining performance, as measured by 
Tobin’s Q, did not produce significant results. This is consistent with the findings of 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and highlights that the ownership structure of an entity is 
unique to the individual corporation. Although a dispersed group of shareholders 
intensifies the agency problem, it also generates compensating advantages.  
However, where accounting profit is used as the performance indicator, management 
stock ownership is a more highly significant and negative predictor of performance 
  28compared with the ordinary least squares approach. Once again, this is consistent with the 
management entrenchment hypothesis put forth by Morck et. al. (1988) and reinforced by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), but challenges the theory of incentive alignment 
advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
With regard to the determinants of managerial ownership, it appears as though both 
measures of performance have a negative impact on director’s interests within an entity. 
Although this is contrary to the notion that impressive performance would lead 
management to acquire more stock, perhaps they choose to sell stock during periods of 
prosperity “in the expectation that today’s good performance will be followed by poorer 
performance” (Demsetz and Villalonga, p.228). This is also reinforced by the findings of 
Loderer and Martin (1997) who assert that managers of organisations with impressive 
Tobin’s Q results will choose to liquidate part of their stockholdings to diversify their 
wealth.  
The only other notable disparity between ordinary least squares and the two-stage least 
squares regression was the fact that the media dummy variable was no longer significant 
where Tobin’s Q was employed as the performance measure. However, where profit is 
utilised as the performance gauge, firms within the media industry continue to display 
ownership characteristics consistent with this ‘amenity potential’ concept previously 
expounded.  
 
5.2   Three Equation Model 
5.2A OLS  Results 
  29The ordinary least squares results for the three equation model yielded similar results to 
those obtained under the two equation system. Again, we summarise the results from 
employing profit as an alternative to Tobin’s Q. The variables employed to explain 
performance were all insignificant where Tobin’s Q indicates performance. However, in 
a similar manner to the two equation framework, managerial ownership continues to 
negatively effect on profitability in a significant manner. Additionally, market risk, firm 
size and the media dummy variable continued to impact on the level of managerial 
ownership in the same fashion as occurred under the two equation model. The only 
element that differed within the three equation framework was the fact that the finance 
industry dummy variable was no longer a significant negative predictor of ownership 
concentration.   
Ordinary least squares presented some intriguing results for the equation explaining 
leverage. Of the nine variables engaged, only liquidity was significant in describing the 
extent of a corporation’s leverage. Results indicate that liquidity is a negative predictor of 
leverage within an entity which appears confounding. It was anticipated that liquidity 
would positively impact on a firm’s leverage due to the fact that it would facilitate the 
payment of short-term interest as it falls due. However, the negative coefficient reported 
for liquidity challenges this idea. The only plausible reason for liquidity impacting   
negatively on a firm’s debt to asset ratio is the fact that it is generally firms with funding 
shortages that choose to lever upwards. However, as debt financing generally relates to 
long-term funding requirements, opposed to present cash flow issues, this hypothesis is 
not robust. These results highlight the need for further research into the determinants of 
leverage within an organisation’s capital structure.  
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TABLE 3A 
OLS Results for Three Equation Model Where Performance is Measured by 
Average Annual Tobin’s Q 
Note: T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates and documented within ( ). * denotes significant to 10% level; ** denotes 
significant to the 5% level; and, *** denotes significant to the 1% level. The notation used in the above table is as follows: Q is the average of 
annual Tobin’s Q values for 2002 and 2003. Annual Tobin’s Q is calculated as [(year-end book value of debt + year-end market value of equity) / 
year end book value of assets]; MDO is the natural log of [RAWMDO / (100-RAWMDO)]; TOP5 is the natural log of [RAWTOP5 / (100-
RAWTOP5)]; RDSALE is the average ratio of annual R&D expenditure to annual sales, and is the average of the 2002 and 2003 ratios; RDDUM 
is a dummy variable equalling 0 where the firm reports R&D expenditure and 1 where is fails to; LEV is the average ratio of debt to the book 
value of assets, and is calculated as the average of the 2002 and 2003 ratios; MEDIA is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in 
the media industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere; FINANCE is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the finance industry 
and 0 where it operates elsewhere; UTILITY is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the utility industry and 0 where it 
operates elsewhere MKTRISK is the β coefficient obtained from a weekly regression of stock returns on weekly market returns; FIRMRISK is 
the standard error of the β estimate obtained to measure MKTRISK; SALES is the average annual sales results obtained in 2002 and 2003; LIQ 
relates to the average year-end current ratio in 2002 and 2003, where current ratio is calculated as (Current Assets / Current Liabilities). With 
regard to banking institutions, LIQ is calculated as (loans / deposits). For insurance companies, LIQ is determined by (Premiums / Claims); 
PAYOUT is the average annual payout ratio over 2002 and 2003 as is calculated as [(annual dividends paid to ordinary shareholders / total 
annual net income) x 100]; PAYPEDUM is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm had negative EPS, or 0 where EPS was positive; P/E is a 
measure of market timing and is calculated as (stock price / EPS) and averaged over 2002 and 2003; and, RETPROFIT is the average annual 
balance of retained earnings over 2002 and 2003 including legal reserves and the current year’s net profit. 
       Performance        Ownership       Leverage 
Variable OLS  BIASED  OLS  Variable  OLS  BIASED OLS Variable  OLS  BIASED OLS
INTERCEPT  1.476 1.247  INTERCEPT -5.454 -4.686  INTERCEPT  42.77 45.16 
 (5.250***)  (2.157**)   (-7.067***) (-4.606***)   (5.756***) (5.689***) 
MDO  - -0.0821  LEV  - 0.0004  SALES  -7.62E-10 -8.08E-10 
 -  (-1.055)    -  (0.0227)    (-1.147)  (-1.209) 
TOP5  -0.0572 0.0589  MEDIA  2.571 2.314  MKTRISK  2.883 2.659 
 (-0.1888)  (0.1814)   (2.344**) (2.107**)   (0.3978)  (0.3656) 
RDSALE  0.0266 0.0222 FINANCE  -1.431 -1.836  FIRMRISK  -23.42 -23.60 
 (1.262)  (0.9668)   (-1.375)  (-1.731*)   (-0.5919) (-0.5946) 
RDDUM  -0.227 -0.0879  UTILITY  -0.3540 -0.5824  LIQ  -6.17 -6.031 
 (-0.5577)  (-0.2041)    (-0.3465)  (-0.5466)   (-2.46**) (-2.392**) 
LEV  - -0.0059  MKTRISK  3.132 3.24  Q  - -1.698 
 -  (-0.4634)    (3.344***) (3.481***)   -  (-0.8754) 
MEDIA  -0.3558 -0.2082 FIRMRISK  -2.541 -3.588  PAYOUT  -0.0116 -0.0213 
 (-0.5436)  (-0.3048)    (-0.5539)  (-0.7807)    (-0.28)  (-0.4953) 
FINANCE  -0.7132 -1.003  SALES  -2.56E-10 -2.68E-10  PAYPEDUM  3.97 3.426 
 (-1.087)  (1.413)    (-4.169***) (-4.375***)   (0.5572)  (0.4776) 
UTILITY  -0.3533 -0.3884  Q  - -0.4075 P/E  -0.1272 -0.0868 
 (-0.5575)  (-0.5656)    - (-1.668)   (-0.6754) (-0.4467) 
         RETPROFIT  7.19E-10 7.75E-10 
           (0.5212)  (0.5595) 
            
R
2 0.1139 0.1411  R
2 0.5357 0.5658  R
2 0.2378 0.2521 
Adjusted R
2 -0.0097 -0.0264 Adjusted  R
2 0.4709 0.4811  Adjusted  R
2 0.0891 0.0839 
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TABLE 3B 
OLS Results for Three Equation Model Where Performance is Measured by 
Average Accounting Profit 
Note: T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates and documented within ( ). * denotes significant to 10% level; ** denotes significant to the 5% 
level; and, *** denotes significant to the 1% level. The notation used in the above table is as follows: The notation used in the above table is as follows: 
PROFIT is the average of annual return on capital values for 2002 and 2003. Return on capital is calculated as [(net income / capital employed) x 100]; 
MDO is the natural log of [RAWMDO / (100-RAWMDO)]; TOP5 is the natural log of [RAWTOP5 / (100-RAWTOP5)]; RDSALE is the average ratio of 
annual R&D expenditure to annual sales, and is the average of the 2002 and 2003 ratios; RDDUM is a dummy variable equalling 0 where the firm reports 
R&D expenditure and 1 where is fails to; LEV is the average ratio of debt to the book value of assets, and is calculated as the average of the 2002 and 2003 
ratios; MEDIA is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the media industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere; FINANCE is a dummy 
variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the finance industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere; UTILITY is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the 
firm operates in the utility industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere MKTRISK is the β coefficient obtained from a weekly regression of stock returns on 
weekly market returns; FIRMRISK is the standard error of the β estimate obtained to measure MKTRISK; SALES is the average annual sales results 
obtained in 2002 and 2003; LIQ relates to the average year-end current ratio in 2002 and 2003, where current ratio is calculated as (Current Assets / Current 
Liabilities). With regard to banking institutions, LIQ is calculated as (loans / deposits). For insurance companies, LIQ is determined by (Premiums / Claims); 
PAYOUT is the average annual payout ratio over 2002 and 2003 as is calculated as [(annual dividends paid to ordinary shareholders / total annual net 
income) x 100]; PAYPEDUM is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm had negative EPS, or 0 where EPS was positive; P/E is a measure of market timing 
and is calculated as (stock price / EPS) and averaged over 2002 and 2003; and, RETPROFIT is the average annual balance of retained earnings over 2002 
and 2003 including legal reserves and the current year’s net profit.  
Performance Ownership  Leverage 
Variable OLS BIASED  OLS  Variable  OLS BIASED  OLS Variable  OLS BIASED  OLS
INTERCEPT  5.895 -0.3523  INTERCEPT  -5.454 -4.358  INTERCEPT  42.77 43.08 
 (1.790*)  (-0.0533)    (-7.067***) (-3.467***)    (5.756***) (4.305***) 
MDO  - -1.614  LEV  - 0.0030  SALES  -7.62E-10 -7.65E-10 
 -  (-1.813*)    -  (0.1603)    (-1.147)  (-1.131) 
TOP5  -2.948 -1.051  MEDIA  2.571 2.305  MKTRISK  2.883 2.856 
 (-0.831)  (-0.2831)    (2.345**)  (2.065**)    (0.3978)  (0.3880) 
RDSALE  0.0780 0.0362  FINANCE  -1.431 -1.818  FIRMRISK  -23.42 -24.50 
 (0.3164)  (0.1378)    (-1.375)  (-1.678)    (-0.5919)  (-0.5307) 
RDDUM  -5.434 -2.716  UTILITY  -0.3540 -0.4184  LIQ  -6.171 -6.151 
 (-1.140)  (-0.5516)    (-0.3465)  (-0.3897)    (-2.46**)  (-2.390**) 
LEV  - -0.0528  MKTRISK  3.133 3.305 PROFIT  - -0.0128 
 -  (-0.3619)    (3.344***) (3.489***)   -  (-0.0473) 
MEDIA  2.777 5.985 FIRMRISK  -2.541 -7.546 PAYOUT  -0.0116 -0.0125 
 (0.3622)  (0.7662)    (-0.5539)  (-1.282)    (-0.2799)  (-0.2712) 
FINANCE  0.3976 -5.014  SALES  -2.56E-10 -2.75E-10  PAYPEDUM  3.970 3.876 
 (0.0518)  (-0.6178)    (-4.169***) (-4.362***)    (0.5572)  (0.5178) 
UTILITY  4.381 2.604  PROFIT  - -0.0411  P/E  -0.1272 -0.1242 
 (0.5902)  (0.3317)    -  (-1.342)    (-0.6754)  (-0.6172) 
         RESERVES  7.19E-10 7.20E-10 
           (0.5212)  (0.5151) 
              
R
2 0.05542 0.1274  R
2 0.5357 0.5559  R
2 0.2378 0.2378 
Adjusted R
2 -0.07638 -0.0429  Adjusted  R
2 0.4709 0.4692 Adjusted  R
2 0.0891 0.0664 
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highlights that ownership structure only impacts on performance where profitability is the 
performance gauge, whilst performance has little effect on managerial ownership. 
 
5.2B  Two Stage Least Squares Results 
Tables 4A and 4B illustrate that results for the two-stage least squares analysis were 
comparable to that reported for the two equation system. Once again, none of the 
variables seeking to explain performance, as measured by Q, were significant. However, 
in a similar manner to the previous two stage tests, managerial ownership had a 
statistically significant and negative influence on performance where profit was engaged 
as the performance measure. Additionally, market risk, firm size and the finance industry 
dummy variable were significant in predicting director’s interests within an organisation 
which is consistent with the two-stage least squares results reported previously. However, 
where both performance measures were significant in explaining ownership under the 
two equation framework, they remain negative but insignificant results within a three 
equation system. This seeks to illustrate that once the endogeneity of leverage is taken 
into account, performance is not significant in the prediction of ownership.  
TABLE 4A 
2SLS Results for Three Equation Model Where Performance is Measured by 
Average Annual Tobin’s Q 
Performance Ownership  Leverage 
Variable 2SLS    Variable  2SLS   Variable  2SLS   
INTERCEPT  1.058   INTERCEPT -2.931   INTERCEPT  53.84  
 (1.072)      (-1.070)      (6.243***)  
MDO  -0.0007   LEV  -0.0030  SALES  -6.78E-10  
 (-0.0059)      (-0.0618)     (-1.070)   
TOP5  -0.0957   MEDIA  1.800   MKTRISK  -3.450  
 (-0.2912)      (1.502)      (-0.4624)   
RDSALE  0.0329   FINANCE  -2.919   FIRMRISK  9.816  
  33 (1.338)     (-2.003*)      (0.2423)   
RDDUM  -0.2424  UTILITY  -1.207   LIQ  -1.783  
 (-0.5667)      (-1.046)      (-0.5781)   
LEV  0.0155   MKTRISK  3.106   Q  -15.97  
 (0.5647)     (3.188***)      (-2.253**)   
MEDIA  -0.3202   FIRMRISK  -2.449   PAYOUT  -0.0243  
 (-0.4348)      (-0.5083)      (-0.6084)   
FINANCE  -0.7168   SALES  -2.61E-10   PAYPEDUM  3.404  
 (-0.9682)     (-4.278***)     (0.5005)   
UTILITY  -0.4716   Q  -1.634   P/E  -0.0295  
 (-0.6756)      (-1.334)      (-0.1598)   
           RESERVES  1.19E-09  
             (0.8964)   
                
R
2 0.1208   R
2 0.5618   R
2 0.3237  
Adjusted R
2 -0.0508   Adjusted  R
2 0.4763   Adjusted  R
2 0.1715  
Note: T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates and documented within ( ). * denotes significant to 10% level; ** denotes 
significant to the 5% level; and, *** denotes significant to the 1% level. The notation used in the above table is as follows: Q is the average 
of annual Tobin’s Q values for 2002 and 2003. Annual Tobin’s Q is calculated as [(year-end book value of debt + year-end market value of 
equity) / year end book value of assets]; MDO is the natural log of [RAWMDO / (100-RAWMDO)]; TOP5 is the natural log of 
[RAWTOP5 / (100-RAWTOP5)]; RDSALE is the average ratio of annual R&D expenditure to annual sales, and is the average of the 2002 
and 2003 ratios; RDDUM is a dummy variable equalling 0 where the firm reports R&D expenditure and 1 where is fails to; LEV is the 
average ratio of debt to the book value of assets, and is calculated as the average of the 2002 and 2003 ratios; MEDIA is a dummy variable 
equalling 1 where the firm operates in the media industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere; FINANCE is a dummy variable equalling 1 
where the firm operates in the finance industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere; UTILITY is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm 
operates in the utility industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere MKTRISK is the β coefficient obtained from a weekly regression of stock 
returns on weekly market returns; FIRMRISK is the standard error of the β estimate obtained to measure MKTRISK; SALES is the average 
annual sales results obtained in 2002 and 2003; LIQ relates to the average year-end current ratio in 2002 and 2003, where current ratio is 
calculated as (Current Assets / Current Liabilities). With regard to banking institutions, LIQ is calculated as (loans / deposits). For insurance 
companies, LIQ is determined by (Premiums / Claims); PAYOUT is the average annual payout ratio over 2002 and 2003 as is calculated as 
[(annual dividends paid to ordinary shareholders / total annual net income) x 100]; PAYPEDUM is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm 
had negative EPS, or 0 where EPS was positive; P/E is a measure of market timing and is calculated as (stock price / EPS) and averaged 
over 2002 and 2003; and, RETPROFIT is the average annual balance of retained earnings over 2002 and 2003 including legal reserves and 
the current year’s net profit.  
 
TABLE 4B 
2SLS Results for Three Equation Model Where Performance is Measured by 
Average Accounting Profit 
 
Performance   Ownership  Leverage 
Variable 2SLS  Variable 2SLS Variable 2SLS 
INTERCEPT  -2.326  INTERCEPT  -4.436  INTERCEPT  43.31 
  (-0.2117)  (-2.776***)  (5.151***) 
MDO  -2.814  LEV  0.0082  SALES  -7.65E-10 
 (-2.067**)    (0.1939)    (-1.137) 
TOP5  -0.4251  MEDIA  2.655  MKTRISK  2.540 
  (-0.1162)   (2.398**)   (0.3295) 
RDSALE  0.0959  FINANCE  -1.986  FIRMRISK  -23.35 
  (0.3504)   (-1.862*)  (-0.5831) 
RDDUM  -2.957  UTILITY  -0.1110  LIQ  -6.063 
 (-0.6207)    (-0.1026)    (-2.293**) 
LEV  -0.1744  MKTRISK  2.821  PROFIT  -0.1186 
 (-0.5701)    (2.833***)    (-0.1452) 
  34MEDIA  9.352  FIRMRISK  -3.540  PAYOUT  -0.0107 
  (1.140)  (-0.7555)  (-0.2528) 
FINANCE  -6.875  SALES  -2.55E-10  PAYPEDUM  4.012 
  (-0.8338)  (-4.225***)   (0.5558) 
UTILITY  2.195  PROFIT  -0.1806  P/E  -0.1286 
  (0.2824)   (-1.669)   (-0.6741) 
       RETPROFIT  7.51E-10 
        (0.5313) 
           
R
2 0.1526 R
2 0.5719  0.2382 
Adjusted R
2 -0.0127 Adjusted  R
2 0.4884  0.0668 
Note: T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates and documented within ( ). * denotes significant to 10% level; ** denotes significant to the 
5% level; and, *** denotes significant to the 1% level. The notation used in the above table is as follows: The notation used in the above table is as 
follows: PROFIT is the average of annual return on capital values for 2002 and 2003. Return on capital is calculated as [(net income / capital employed) x 
100];; MDO is the natural log of [RAWMDO / (100-RAWMDO)]; TOP5 is the natural log of [RAWTOP5 / (100-RAWTOP5)]; RDSALE is the average 
ratio of annual R&D expenditure to annual sales, and is the average of the 2002 and 2003 ratios; RDDUM is a dummy variable equalling 0 where the firm 
reports R&D expenditure and 1 where is fails to; LEV is the average ratio of debt to the book value of assets, and is calculated as the average of the 2002 
and 2003 ratios; MEDIA is a dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the media industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere; FINANCE is a 
dummy variable equalling 1 where the firm operates in the finance industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere; UTILITY is a dummy variable equalling 1 
where the firm operates in the utility industry and 0 where it operates elsewhere MKTRISK is the β coefficient obtained from a weekly regression of stock 
returns on weekly market returns; FIRMRISK is the standard error of the β estimate obtained to measure MKTRISK; SALES is the average annual sales 
results obtained in 2002 and 2003; LIQ relates to the average year-end current ratio in 2002 and 2003, where current ratio is calculated as (Current Assets 
/ Current Liabilities). With regard to banking institutions, LIQ is calculated as (loans / deposits). For insurance companies, LIQ is determined by 
(Premiums / Claims); PAYOUT is the average annual payout ratio over 2002 and 2003 as is calculated as [(annual dividends paid to ordinary 
shareholders / total annual net income) x 100]; PAYPEDUM is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm had negative EPS, or 0 where EPS was positive; 
P/E is a measure of market timing and is calculated as (stock price / EPS) and averaged over 2002 and 2003; and, RETPROFIT is the average annual 
balance of retained earnings over 2002 and 2003 including legal reserves and the current year’s net profit. 
 
 
Interestingly, with regard to the two-stage least squares analysis of leverage, liquidity is 
only significant in explaining a corporation’s borrowing decisions where accounting 
profit is used as the performance measure. Where return on capital is used to gauge a 
firm’s performance, liquidity remains a significantly negative predictor of leverage.  
In contrast, where Tobin’s Q is employed, it is a statistically negative forecaster for a 
firm’s borrowing requirements. Once again, this result appears to contradict the original 
predictions for performance. It was anticipated that an entity’s performance would impact 
positively on leverage due to the tax shields offered by debt. However, the negative 
impact that performance has on leverage is consistent with the pecking order theory of 
financing outlined by Myers (1984), whereby firms prefer to fund operations through 
retained earnings rather than debt or equity. Based on this theory, the coefficient for 
  35retained earnings should also be negative. This is due to the fact that as a corporation’s 
reserves expand, the entity will become less reliant on debt financing. As retained profits 
reported a positive and statistically insignificant relationship with leverage, this 
justification is not robust. The confounding results with regard to the factors affecting 
leverage warrants further research. Perhaps there are elements overlooked within this 
current study that have high explanatory power with regard to the level of debt 
undertaken by firms.  
The results highlighted in this section offer important implications for the management of 
corporations. Particularly, the main finding that was consistent through the initial two 
equation model and subsequent three equation system was the fact that director 
ownership impacts negatively on profitability. This may influence the manner in which 
executive remuneration is administered within Australian corporations, and indeed other 
market-based economies throughout the world. These results highlight that stock 
ownership may not be an efficient tool to induce management to undertake value-
maximising initiatives. Consequently, this paper casts doubt on several widespread 
practices used to enhance corporate governance. Particularly, the justification regarding 
the increasing use of executive stock and option plans is based on the assumption that 
performance will increase due to the incentive alignment theory. The empirical evidence 
within this paper, and reinforced by Cho (1998), suggests that compensation schemes 
such as these may have an adverse effect on performance. Furthermore, a similar 
situation may occur within those companies which compel incumbent management to 
purchase stock in the firm.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
  36This paper has attempted to ascertain the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance. Many previous studies have classified ownership as an endogenous 
variable when seeking to explain performance. Consequently, a two equation system has 
been established to assess the nature of this relationship. The research documented within 
the current investigation distinguishes itself from prior examinations due to the fact that 
leverage is also classified as endogenous. Consequently, a three equation econometric 
model has been developed and empirically investigated using a sample of fifty companies 
listed on the ASX over the period 2002-2003. Ordinary least squares and a two stage least 
squares analysis have been undertaken to establish whether ownership and performance 
are linearly related.  
With regard to the initial two equation system, ordinary least squares results indicate that 
ownership structure and performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q, have a statistically 
insignificant relationship. Where a two stage least squares analysis is employed, Tobin’s 
Q has a significantly negative impact on the level of managerial ownership.  
Where profit is utilised as the performance measure, managerial ownership is a 
significantly negative predictor of performance under ordinary least squares and two 
stage least squares analysis. These findings are congruent to those expounded by Morck 
et. al (1988) with regard to the management entrenchment hypothesis. Interestingly, in 
contrast to the ordinary least squares analysis, profitability, like Tobin’s Q, has a 
significantly negative effect on director’s interests. This seeks to illustrate the fact that 
management may wish to liquidate part of their stockholding during prosperous periods 
to diversify their wealth.  
  37To further investigate the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
performance, a reclassification of variables has been undertaken. Specifically, a three 
equation model was developed based on the notion that leverage is endogenous to the 
system. Where Tobin’s Q was engaged as the performance measure, ordinary least 
squares and two stage least squares examinations yielded insignificant results.  
Management ownership continued to negatively affect performance, as measured by 
profitability. Finally, where both performance measures were significant in explaining 
ownership structure under the two equation model, they are statistically insignificant 
when leverage is reclassified. This seeks to illustrate that once the endogeneity of 
leverage is accounted for, performance is not significant in predicting ownership.  
Whether there is an improvement when systems of equations are estimated and tested 
against each other in a FIML framework has not been undertaken within this literature. In 
this framework it is possible to artificially nest two and three equation systems within a 
comprehensive model. Then leverage can be treated as exogenously, recursively or 
simultaneously determined. It is also possible to specify a system that is exactly identified 
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  41APPENDIX 1 
Summary of Previous Studies 
Authors Ownership Measures Performance Measures Methodology Results
Demsetz & Lehn 
(1985) 
1. % of stock held by top 5 
shareholders 
2. % of stock held by top 20 
shareholders 
3. Herfindahl measure of 
ownership concentration 
4. % of shares controlled by 5 
largest individuals / families 


















No significant relationship 
Morck, Schleifer & 
Vishny (1988) 
% of stock held by directors  1. Tobin’s Q 
2. Accounting Profit 




1. % of shares held by insiders 
2. % of shares held by 
blockholders 














% of stock held by incumbent 
CEO and former CEOs still on 
BOD 
Tobin’s Q  Piecewise Linear Regression Significant  non-monotonic 
relationship 
Loderer & Martin 
(1997) 








Ownership fails to predict 
performance, but performance is 
a negative predictor of 
ownership 
Craswell, Taylor & 
Saywell 1997 
1. % of shares held by directors 
2. % of shares held by 
institutional investors 
Proxy Q (MV Equity / 
BV of Net Assets) 
1. Linear Regression 
2. Curvilinear Regression 
3. Piecewise Regression 
Weak curvilinear Relationship 
Cho (1998)  % of stock held by directors   
Tobin’s Q 
1. Piecewise Linear 
Regression 
2. 2SLS  
3. 3SLS 
Performance affects ownership, 
but ownership fails to predict 
performance 
  42Himmelberg, 
Hubbard & Palia 
(1999) 
% of stock held by insiders, 
managers and directors 
 
Tobin’s Q 
1. Piece Linear Regression 
2. Piecewise Quadratic 
Regression 
Quadratic form ownership 
influence on corporate 
performance 
Holderness, 
Kroszner & Sheehan 
(1999) 








% of stock held by CEO, top 
management and directors 
1. Tobin’s Q 




No significant relationship 
Welch (2003)  1. % of stock held by 
management and directors 
2. % of stock owned by 5 largest 
shareholders 
 
1. Tobin’s Q 
2. Accounting Profit 
1. OLS 
2. 2SLS 




No significant relationship 
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Δ   = Number of non-zero endogenous variables in the g
th equation 
G  = Number of non-zero endogenous variables in the system of equations 
K
*  = Number of non-zero pre-determined variables in the g
th equation 
K  = Number of non-zero pre-determined variables in the system of equation 
K**  = Number of non-zero pre-determined variables not appearing in the g
th equation 
 




Δ – 1, where K
** = K – K
*
 
For equation 1: 
G
Δ   = 2, as there are two endogenous non-zero variables within this equation (Q,  
       MDO) 
K**   = 3, as there are six pre-determined variables within the system and only three 





Δ – 1 
= 3 ≥ 1,       highlighting that equation 1 satisfies the order condition. 
 
For equation 2: 
G
Δ   = 2, as there are two endogenous non-zero variables within this equation (Q,  
       MDO) 
K**   = 2, as there are six pre-determined variables within the system and only four 






Δ – 1 
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Δ   = Number of non-zero endogenous variables in the g
th equation 
G  = Number of non-zero endogenous variables in the system of equations 
K
*  = Number of non-zero pre-determined variables in the g
th equation 
K  = Number of non-zero pre-determined variables in the system of equation 
K**  = Number of non-zero pre-determined variables not appearing in the g
th equation 
 




Δ – 1, where K
** = K – K
*
 
For equation 1: 
G
Δ   = 3, as there are three endogenous non-zero variables within this equation (Q,  
       MDO & LEV) 
K**   = 7, as there are nine pre-determined variables within the system and only two  





Δ – 1 
= 7 ≥ 2,       highlighting that equation 1 satisfies the order condition. 
 
For equation 2: 
G
Δ   = 3, as there are three endogenous non-zero variables within this equation (Q,  
       MDO & LEV) 
K**   = 6, as there are nine pre-determined variables within the system and only three 






Δ – 1 
= 6 ≥ 2,       highlighting that equation 2 satisfies the order condition. 
 
For equation 3: 
G
Δ   = 2, as there are two endogenous non-zero variables (Q & LEV) 
K**   = 2, as there are nine pre-determined variables within the system and seven  
                   pre-determined variables within equation 1 (SALES, MKTRISK,  





Δ – 1 
= 2 ≥ 2,      highlighting that equation 3 satisfies the order condition. 
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List of Firms from the Final Sample 
 
Firm  Name         ASX  Code 
Altium                    ALU. 
A M P                     A M P  
Ansell                      ANN 
APN  News  &  Media                  APN 
Axon  Instruments                  AXN 
Austereo  Group                  AEO 
Australian Gas & Light Co.                 AGL 
BHP  Billiton                   BHP 
Billabong  International                 BBG 
Brandrill                   BDL 
Burns Philp & Co.                   BPC 
Burswood                   BIR 
Centro  Properties                  CEP 
C o c h l e a r                    C O H  
Collection  House                  CLH 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia               CBA 
Computershare                 CPU 
Crane  Group                   CRG 
David  Jones                   DJS 
Energy  Developments                  ENE 
Envestra                   ENV 
Foodland  Associated                  FOA 
Fosters  Group                   FGL 
F u t u r i s   C o r p .                    F C L  
Harvey Norman Holdings                  HVN 
Hutchison Telecommunications Australia             HTA 
Intellect  Holdings                  IHG 
  46James Hardie Industries NV                 JHX 
J u p i t e r s                   J U P  
L i h i r   G o l d                    L H G  
Macquarie  Bank                  MBL 
Mayne  Group                   MAY 
Mirvac  Group                   MGR 
National  Foods                 NFD 
Newcrest  Mining                    NCM 
News  Corporation                  NCP 
Novus  Petroleum                  NVS 
O r i c a                       O R I  
Patrick  Corporation                  PRK 
P o w e r t e l                    P W T  
Publishing and Broadcasting                 PBL 
QANTAS                   QAN 
QBE Insurance Group                  QBE 
Rio  Tinto                   RIO 
Santos                    STO 
Seven  Network                 SEV 
Sims  Group                   SMS 
Southcorp                   SRP 
Stockland                   SGP 
Toll  Holdings                   TOL 
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